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1 Introduction
Numerous distributed and parallel applications use ring-based algorithms. The latter are based
on the principle of the uniqueness of a token which travels along a logical ring that comprises
all the nodes of the system. Examples of such algorithms are mutual exclusion [1], termination
detection [2] [3], leader election [4], [5], [6], moving sequencer or privilege-based total order
broadcast algorithms [7], group membership [8], etc.
In a distributed token-based algorithm, at any moment, there is at most one node that holds
the token (safety property) and the token holder eventually grants it to its successor in the logical
ring, i.e., the token circulates among all nodes and eventually every node will hold it (liveness
property). However, in case of failure, the detection of the token loss and the regeneration of a
new token can be quite costly and not very effective if scalability is taken into account. Therefore,
for performance sake, fault tolerant token-based algorithms should not involve all nodes of the
system for electing a new token holder in case of failure of the previous one; it should avoid
monitoring the liveness of all of nodes, using reliable broadcast communication primitives, and
reconstructing the logical ring, since they are costly operations. A third point is that, if the
token holds some information such as in [2] [7], the latter should be easily restored when the new
token is regenerated.
Therefore, aiming at overcoming scalability, performance, and loss of token information issues
discussed above, we propose in this paper a new approach that renders the token fault tolerant
to node crashes and which can be easily “plugged” in existing token ring distributed algorithm
applications.
By keeping temporal copies of the token and without using reliable broadcast, our algorithm
tolerates at most k consecutive faults in relation to the ring order which defines the sequence of
token holders and satisfies the points previously raised: it is scalable since a node monitors at
most k other nodes and it starts (respectively, stops) monitoring the token when the latter is in
(respectively, out of) its neighborhood; there is no need to regenerate the token by using a global
election algorithm nor to reconstruct the ring; finally, the information the token retains can be
easier restored if the token holder fails.
Our token regeneration strategy is very effective in terms of latency when compared to existing
approaches which usually monitor all sites, involve all sites for the detection of the loss of the
token, and require a global election and/or a group membership protocol to chose a new token
holder. In our approach, the token is regenerated instantaneously: when the failure of the token
holder is detected, one of the site knows that it has the right to regenerate the token without
needing to communicate with other sites whatsoever. Notice that our algorithm do not use
reliable broadcast, which is very costly in terms of latency. At the same time, we should emphasize
that it is not algorithmically trivial to provide such an “instantaneous regeneration”. To this end,
our algorithm keeps a set invariants, which are ensured, at any given time. Interestingly that
the latter are related both to the current state of the nodes and the messages in transit.
We also point out that our algorithm can tolerate more than k faults, provided that the latter
are not consecutive. Furthermore, we present in this paper a theoretical study of the value of
k (see section 4) that show that the assumption of k consecutive failure is quite realistic. For
instance, in a system with 10000 it is just necessary to have k = 20 in order to tolerate, with a
probability closer to 100%, 50% of the nodes that crash.
A last interesting remark is that, combined with any protocol which maintains a virtual token
circulation on top of a graph (e.g. a depth-first token circulation protocol), our approach can be
applied on any arbitrary graph which corresponds to a given topology. Moreover, when failures
(at most k consecutive nodes in the corresponding logical ring) take place, the graph does not
need to be reconstructed.
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The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 defines the computation model and presents the
fault-tolerant token “plug-in” algorithm. Some examples of well-known distributed algorithms
that could call the API functions offered by our algorithm in order to render the token tolerant
to losses as well as a use case are described in section 3. Section 4 presents a theoretical study
of the value of k in relation to the number of nodes and total number of failures while section 5
discusses how our approach could be extended to a general topology and its constraints. Section
6 comments on related work. Finally, section 7 concludes the paper.
2 Reliable Token-based Algorithm
We consider a distributed system consisting of a finite set Π of N > 1 sites, namely Π =
{S0, S1, . . . , SN−1} which communicate only by message passing. Communication channels are
reliable, but messages might be delivered out of order. There is one process per node. Hence,
the words node, site and process are interchangeable.
TheN nodes are logically organized in a ring and each node knows the identity of its respective
k + 1 predecessors and k + 1 successors with which it can communicate. To avoid complicated
notations, we note that the successor of node Si is Si+1 and not S(i+1)%N .
Initially, one node holds the token which circulates in a given direction. We denote ST the
current token holder which always grants the token to its direct successor within a bounded
delay.
In order to ensure the uniqueness of the token, false suspicion of node failure can never take
place [9]. i.e., the failure detection mechanism of our algorithm should eventually detect failures
but never makes a mistake about them. Therefore, our algorithm executes either on top of
synchronous systems or asynchronous ones enriched with a perfect failure detector.
Nodes can fail by crashing, and this crash is permanent. A correct process is a process that
does not crash during a run, otherwise, it is faulty. Let k (k < N − 1), which is known to every
process, be the maximum number of consecutive faulty processes in the ring.
Our algorithm offers three API functions to the application: SafeSendToken, SafeReceiveTo-
ken, and UpdateToken. The application must then replace its original function to send the token
to its successor in the ring and the one to receive the token from its predecessor by the functions
SafeSendToken and SafeReceiveToken respectively. The function UpdateToken can be used by
the application whenever, in case of failure, it is necessary to update the information kept by the
token.
Basically, the idea of our approach is to avoid the loss of the token due to crashes by main-
taining temporal backup copies. Whenever the node that holds the token grants it to its direct
successor by sending a 〈TOKEN 〉 message, the former also transparently sends a copy of such a
message to k successors of the latter in the ring. Upon reception of a 〈TOKEN 〉 message, a node
starts monitoring the liveness of a subset of nodes that received the same copy of the message.
A node has the exclusive right to use the token when either the received 〈TOKEN 〉 message
informs that it is the next node that can do it, or when the monitoring mechanism of this node
informs that all nodes whose liveness it controls have crashed.
One could argue that our solution implies k additional messages per 〈TOKEN 〉 emission.
It does indeed, yet its message complexity remains equal to that of the original algorithm. In
addition, our monitoring mechanism for failure detection presents a much lower cost in terms of
messages when compared to other solutions where a site usually monitors all the others.
Note that it may happen that at a given moment there is no token in the system because the
new one has not been regenerated yet. In our algorithm, a copy of the token is not considered a
token as long as it does not replace the original one.
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2.1 Variables and Messages
Node Si keeps the local variables countSi and tokenSi . The former is used to avoid that a
site considers an old 〈TOKEN 〉 message as a valid one while the latter controls if Si holds the
token, a copy of it, or neither of them. The values REAL, BACKUP , or NONE can be assigned
to tokenSi : (1) tokenSi is equal to REAL whenever Si has the right to use the token (token
holder). At a given time t, only one process has its token variable equal to REAL which ensures
the uniqueness of the token; (2) the value BACKUP is assigned to tokenSi if it is one of the k
direct successor nodes of ST and it maintains a valid copy of the token. Notice that if Si does
not crash, tokenSi will eventually change from BACKUP to REAL; (3) the tokenSi variable has
value NONE when Si holds neither a REAL nor a BACKUP token.
The following two sets are also handled by Si:
• DSi (Detection set): This set includes both the processes that Si must monitor, the liveness
and Si itself. It is composed of {ST . . . Si}, i.e., the set of processes between ST and Si in
the ring increasing order, including both sites. It thus has at most k + 1 sites.
• FSi (Faulty set): The set of processes that Si has detected to be faulty.
If the value of tokenSi is either equal to REAL or BACKUP , then DSi 6= ∅. Remark that the
k+1 detection sets are constructed in such a way that they are different from each other but have
nested intersections. ST is present in all detection sets. The advantage of such a construction is
the lower cost in terms of messages when compared to an all-to-all monitoring of k + 1 nodes.
Furthermore, the election of the node that will hold the new token in case of node failures does
not require any extra message.
Figure 1 shows N = 12 sites organized in a ring with k=3. In Figure 1(a), process S4 is
the token holder and processes S5, S6, S7 keep copies of the token while in Figure 1(b), we can
observe the detection set D of processes S4, . . . , S7.
A 〈TOKEN 〉 message contains the identification of the successor of the message sender as
well as the current value of the count variable of this node. Moreover, the 〈TOKEN 〉 message
might contain application data.
2.2 Algorithm Description
Algorithm 2 describes our fault tolerant token algorithm for a site Si on ring topologies.
For the sake of simplicity, the liveness checking of processes that belong to DSi and the
detection of node crashes are not shown in the pseudo code of the algorithms. Whenever the set
DSi is updated, the function updateDetection(DSi) stops monitoring the liveness of the processes
in the previous DSi and starts monitoring the liveness of the processes in the new DSi . On the
other hand, when the crash of Sj is detected, a Suspected event is generated to Si. Note that there
are no false suspicions. A second remark is that Si includes itself in DSi not for liveness checking
reasons but just to easily conclude that it holds the REAL token when all the predecessor nodes
that it monitors have crashed. A third point is that, in terms of implementation of the monitoring
mechanism, it would not be necessary that Si monitors all the sites of its DSi at the same time.
It could just monitor the closest predecessor in its DSi that it has not detected to be faulty. If
the latter crashes, it then starts monitoring the predecessor of this site that also belongs to its
D.
In the initialization phase (lines 1-1), we assume that S0 holds the token. Hence, each process
Si ∈ {S1, . . . Sk} has a copy of the token (token = BACKUP) and initializes its respective D to
{S0, . . . Si}. It then starts checking the liveness of the processes other than itself, (line 1) which
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(f) The holder and the k “backups”
after a release from S7
Figure 1: Ring-based reliable token algorithm with k = 3
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/* D: Detection set */1
/* F: Faulty set */2
Initialisation ()3
count ← 04
F ← { }5
case i = 06
token ← REAL7
D ← {S0}8
case 0 < i ≤ k9
token ← BACKUP10
D ← {S0, .., Si}11
case k < i12
token ← NONE13
D ← { }14
UpdateDetection(D)15
SafeSendToken (〈TOKEN〉) to Si+116
count ← count + 117
Send 〈TOKEN,Si+1,count〉 to {Si+1, .., Si+k+1}18
token ← NONE19
D ← { }20
UpdateDetection(D)21
SafeReceiveToken (〈TOKEN,ST ,countrecv〉) from Sj22
if count < countrecv then23
count ← countrecv24
D ← {ST , .., Si}25
if Si = ST then26
token ← REAL27
DeliverToken(〈TOKEN 〉)28






F ← F ∪ Sj35
if D/F = {Si} then36
UseBackup()37
UseBackup ()38





Figure 2: Ring-based fault tolerant token algorithm
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belong to its D set. All the other processes of the system do not keep any valid copy of the token
at all (token = NONE ).
The function SafeSendToken allows Si to send the token to its successor Si+1 and a copy
of it to {Si+2 . . . Si+k+1}, signaling that the next owner of the REAL token is the site Si+1
(See Figures 1(c) and 1(d)). Notice that the function uses unicast sending primitive and not
necessarily needs to respect the order of {Si+1 . . . Si+k+1}. Since Si does not keep a copy of
the token anymore (token = NONE ) it stops monitoring other processes (line 1). Note that we
assume that Si can call the function SafeSendToken only if it holds the REAL token and once
it does, it grants the token.
Upon the reception of a TOKEN message, which is not an old message, from Sj (SafeRe-
ceiveToken〈TOKEN,ST , countrecv〉), Si updates its variable countSi with the value received in
the TOKEN message (line 1). It then sets its DSi with nodes between ST and itself including
both sites (line 1). Then, (1) if Si is the next holder of the token, it sets its tokenSi variable to
REAL and delivers the token to the application (lines 1-1); (2) if Si detects that all the nodes it
current monitors have crashed, it becomes the site that holds the REAL token by calling function
UseBackup() (lines 1-1. See Figure 1(e)). It delivers in the same way that in (1) the token to
the application. When it further releases the token, it will send it to its k + 1 successors, as
previously explained (See Figure 1(f)); (3) otherwise Si sets its tokenSi variable to BACKUP
(line 1). In all cases, it updates the set of sites it must monitor (line 1).
When Si is informed (ReceiveSuspected(Sj), line 1) of the crash of Sj , one of the nodes it
monitors, it updates (FSi), the set of faulty nodes of which it is aware (line 1). If all the processes
whose liveness it monitors have crashed, Si calls the function UseBackup() in order to become
the new holder of the REAL token.
Function UseBackup() updates countSi by adding the number of nodes that Si has detected
as crashed (line 1), which ensures that old pending token messages that may arrive later to Si
will be discarded. It also changes Si’s token variable from BACKUP to REAL (line 1). Before
delivering the token to the application, Si can update the information associated to the token
(line 1), if necessary (e.g., Misra’s detection termination algorithm [2]). Note that the token
regeneration is very effective since it basically consists of considering one of the backup copies as
the REAL token.
Due to lack of space the formal proof of the algorithm correctness is not presented in the
article itself but can be found in the appendix1.
3 Examples of applications
In this section we discuss how some algorithms found in the literature, which are based on the
circulation and uniqueness of a token (or objects that are seen as tokens), can call the functions
offered by our API in order to become tolerant to token (objects) losses in the presence of node
failures. For all the examples, we consider that it is possible to implement a monitoring node
failure mechanism which never makes a false suspicions.
3.1 Mutual exclusion
Our algorithm naturally adapts itself to Le Lann’s mutual exclusion algorithm [1] where the
exclusive access to a shared resource by a site depends on the possession of the single token,
which circulates over all sites. Whenever a process receives the token, if it wants to access the
1If the paper is accepted the proof will be available in an INRIA Technical Report which will be referenced by
the article.
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shared resource, it does so; otherwise it sends the token to its successor. Upon releasing the
access to the shared resource, a site also sends the token to its successor. In order to ensure
the correct execution of the algorithm in case of node failures, each process just needs to call
the SafeSendToken and SafeReceiveToken functions offered by our communication API for
sending and receiving the token respectively.
In Le Lann’s algorithm, the token keeps circulating on the ring even when no node requires
it. Martin’s algorithm [10] removes this constraint by including requests in Le Lann’s algorithm:
requests for the token move in one direction while the token moves in the opposite direction.
The holder of the token keeps it as long as it does not receive a request. In order to render
the algorithm tolerant to failures neither the token nor the requests can be lost in presence
of node failures. However, each node request can be seen as a single object like the token
(“request-object”). The functions SafeSendToken and SafeReceiveToken can thus be called
to render each request tolerant to loss. Every request can be replaced by a 〈TOKEN 〉 message
which has the identification, Sq, of the node that issued the request. Requests are in this way
uniquely identified by Sq. Nevertheless, we should point out that the initialisation function of
our algorithm ensures the presence of k + 1 copies of the token but not of the requests; in order
to guarantee the circulation of the k+ 1 copies of the request issued by Sq, it would be necessary
to impose that Sq will not fail before sending the k+1 copies of the “request-object” (〈TOKEN 〉)
message. On the other hand, the loss of Sq’s request is not actually a problem in this case since
it concerns a request of a faulty node. Hence, the liveness of the algorithm is not violated. A
final remark is that since the maximum number of pending requests is N − 1 for a ring with
N sites, our algorithm must control the circulation and uniqueness of at most N − 1 requests
(tokens). In other words, the number of “request-object” (〈TOKEN 〉) messages is bounded.
3.2 Termination Detection
Some algorithms that detect the termination of distributed applications [3] [2] consider that
the N nodes on top of which the application runs are organized in a logical ring. The guiding
principle of such algorithms is to verify that all the N processes are in the passive state after a
complet round of the token. A process becomes passive when it finishes its execution. However,
the reception of an application message by a passive process makes it actif again. In Misra’s
algorithm [2] nodes compose a unidirectional logical ring and messages are received by a node in
FIFO order. The token, which circulates among all nodes, has the variable passive_count that
sums up the number of nodes that the token crossed which is in passive state upon reception of
the token. A node that holds the token sends it to its sucessor only when becoming passive. If
the latter was already passive when it receives the token, it adds one to passive_count; otherwise
it restarts passive_count to 1.
The termination of the application is detected when all the nodes are passive after one
round of the token (passive_count = N for each node). This algorithm can use the func-
tions SafeSendToken and SafeReceiveToken to ensure the circulation of the token in case
of failures. A faulty node can be viewed as a passive one. Nevertheless, if the holder of the
REAL token did not receive it from its predecessor (crash of one or more consecutive nodes),
the token’s passive_count variable must be updated before being delivered to the termina-
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tion detection algorithm. The UpdateToken() function would then have the following code:
UpdateToken (〈TOKEN〉)44
if (〈TOKEN〉.passive_count← 〈TOKEN〉.passive_count+ (#(D)− 1)) > N45
then
〈TOKEN 〉.passive_count ← N46
Note that we consider that the node that initiates the detection algorithm can fail only after
sending the k + 1 copies of the 〈TOKEN 〉 message.
3.3 Leader Election
Several authors [4], [5], [6], etc. have proposed algorithms for the leader election problem for
nodes organized in a logical ring. A node wishing to become the leader sends a claim message
(〈TOKEN 〉) which will travel along the ring according to the comparison and transmission
rules of the algorithm. For instance, in Chang and Roberts’ algorithm [4], a claim message is
transmitted from node to node in the ring until it is received by a node which is a better leader
candidate. A node considers itself the new leader when it receives its own claim message.
In order to guarantee the correct execution of Chang and Roberts’ algorithm despite node
failures, the circulation and uniqueness of the claim messages should be ensured. However,
similarly to the requests of Martins’s mutual exclusion algorithm, a claim message could be seen
as a single object that travels along the ring. In other words, the application can use the functions
offered by our algorithm to render each claim message tolerant to failure: a 〈TOKEN 〉 message
which contains the identification, Sclaim, of the leader candidate. Since for a ring with N sites,
the maximum number of pending claims is N , our algorithm must control the circulation and
uniqueness of at most N “claim-objects” (tokens).
Our algorithm guarantees that in the presence of at most k consecutive failures, the leader
election algorithm ends (if and only if one of the candidates sent k+1 copies of the claim message).
It is worth mentioning that the elected leader is not necessarily a non faulty process. On the
other hand, we could offer an UpdateToken function to this end. Node Sj becomes leader upon
receiving its own claim message (〈TOKEN 〉 message where Sclaim = Sj). The latter was sent
when the function SafeSendToken was called. Consequently, the message is also received by the
successors of Sj , that, therefore, monitor Sj . If Sj fails, the function UpdateToken is executed
by Si, the non faulty successor of Sj that has a non empty detection set. If Si had previously
registered Sj as the leader (currenLeader), it knows that the leader has crashed. Hence, in this
case, Sj can be replaced by Si in the corresponding 〈TOKEN 〉 (claim) message in order to ensure
the election of a non faulty node. Receiving its own claim, Si becomes the new leader. The code
of the UpdateToken function is thus:
UpdateToken (〈TOKEN〉)47
if currentLeader = Sclaim of 〈TOKEN〉 then48
set Si as Sclaim in 〈TOKEN 〉49
3.4 Use Case: TranspeerToken
In [11], we have proposed TranspeerToken, a system for managing transactions for WEB2.0
applications, which is based on the existing Transpeer system [12]. Contrarily to the latter,
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TranspeerToken is able to manage peak load of transaction requests efficiently, i.e., when most
of transactions try to access the same data concurrently.
The Transpeer system accepts transactions issued from Web application clients. To this end,
it keeps several transaction routing nodes, denoted TMs, that route each transaction request to
the most suitable data server to process it. In order to serialize transactions that operate on
possibly intersecting datasets, a common distributed directory stores the history of transactions
(metadata) performed on every dataset. Although the common directory is distributed, trans-
action requests reference a single node per dataset which can thus suffers from contention when
several concurrent clients attempt to access the same dataset. In other words, Transpeer fails
to cope with peak load and can, therefore, fails to process transactions when a TM receives the
majority of the request load.
We have leverage the above bottleneck problem by organizing the TMs into a logical ring
and replacing the shared directory by our token-ring algorithm. Each token is associated to a
metadata, carried around the TMs ring, similarly to the approach proposed for the requests of
Martin’s mutual exclusion algorithm (see section 3.1). Hence, TranspeerToken avoids locking the
metadata stored on a node of the common distributed directory which would induce contention.
Furthermore, as our token-ring algorithm tolerates the failure of k = 5 consecutive nodes of the




















Original Transpeer without fault
TranspeerToken without fault
TranspeerToken with 50% faults
Figure 3: Fault tolerance overhead
Evaluation performance results were quite promising. For instance, Figure 3 shows that
TranspeerToken tolerates better peek load than Transpeer even in presence of failures. The
experiment consisted of processing 500 transactions. It started with 20 TMs; then 10 TMs
fail upon receiving their 5th transaction. The peak load (transaction request frequency) varied
relatively from 1 to 10 times the initial load. We have then measured the maximum response time
of the transactions for both systems without failure as well as TranspeerToken with 50% of nodes
that fail, such as it did no more than 5 consecutive failures. We observe that, although tolerating
faults comes at a cost (approx. 40% overhead on the average response time), TranspeerToken
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∀k > 0, ∀f ≤ N, Wk(f,N) =

1 If N = f ∧ f ≤ k
0 If N = f ∧ f > k
n If N − 1 = f ∧ f ≤ k
0 If N − 1 = f ∧ f > k∑min(k,f)
i=0 Wk(f − i,N − i− 1) Else
Figure 4: Wk(f,N): the number of possible distributions of f failures in a ring of N sites such
that there are at most k consecutive failures.
remains faster than Transpeer for high peak load (when load exceeds seven times the initial load).
Note that during one run, the transaction response time keeps growing because of the peak load
behavior.
More details about both systems as well as other evaluation experiments results can be found
in [11].
4 Theoretical study of the value of k
Our algorithm is based on the assumption that there are at most k consecutive failures in the
ring. It is thus interesting to study the relation between the value of k, the total number N of
nodes of the ring and the number f of failures. In other words, a discussion of the following
probability:
Pk(f,N): Probability of having at most k consecutive node crashes among the N nodes that
compose the ring in presence of f failures.
Due to lack of space, a detailed description of how this probability can be calculated is not
presented in this article. Basically, its calculation consists of distributing the f failures with
regard to S0 taking into account its state, i.e., either S0 is correct or it belongs to a sequence of
i consecutive failure nodes (i ≤ k). In both cases, the remaining failures (respectively f or f − i)
must be distributed in the rest of the ring, composed of nodes other than the former. Notice
that with this approach, such a distribution is analogous of distributing the failures in a chain
(queue) of sites. Let us consider the position of the first non faulty node2 among the first k ones
of the chain, i.e., a sequence of i failures (0 ≤ i ≤ k) followed by a non faulty site. By recurrence,
we can then distribute the f − i failures among the N − i − 1 sites of the chain. It is worth
emphasizing that, contrarily to a ring, this recurrence is possible in the case of a chain since the
crashes at the beginning of it do not join the ones at the end of it; otherwise, a sequence of k+ 1
consecutive failures might be formed.
According to the previous enumeration, Figure 4 shows Wk(f,N): the number of possible
distributions of f failures in a ring of N sites such that there are at most k consecutive failures.
In order to study how to size k, we have programmed the above function by inferring that
Pk(f,N) = Wk(f,N)/C
f
N Figures 5(a) and 5(b) show, for 10% and 50% of nodes that crash
respectively, the probability to stand up such failures for queues with 50, 500, 1000, 5000 and
10000 nodes.
In both figures, we can observe that the probabilities are functions that go towards a “resilience
threshold”. In Figure 5(a), there is a small increase of this threshold when the number of nodes
2the case where there is no correct node (N = f) is not neglected in the calculation.
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(b) More than 50% of failures.
Figure 5: Probability study of having at most k consecutive node crashes in a ring.
RR n° 8359
14 L. Arantes & J. Sopena
increases. For instance, the threshold for a system composed of 10000 nodes is k = 8. On the
other hand, when the number of failures increases to 50% (Figure 5(b)) the increasing of the
threshold is more significant when the number of nodes increases. Nevertheless, in a system with
10000 it is just necessary to have k = 20 in order to tolerate, with a probability closer to 100%,
50% of the nodes that crash.
In summary, such a study shows that with a small value for k, our approach can tolerate a
much greater number of node crashes, specially in large systems.
We should point out that this study does not consider that the ring can be reconstructed.
If it was the case, the stand up to failures would be greater. A second comment is that even if
the probability of having more than k consecutive failures with the threshold is extremely small,
such a probability is not null. Thus, if it happens, we could think of offering a function, rarely
called, which would be able to regenerate the new token (e.g. a global election algorithm).
5 Generalizing our algorithm
Our algorithm is based on a logical ring topology but we could think of extending its k-copies
principle to any topology aiming at rendering other token-based algorithms, whose sites are not
logically organized into a ring, fault tolerant. However, the concept of sending k + 1 copies of
the token, in this case, confronts two problems:
• It is necessary to ensure that the k successors of the token holder are all distinct which it
is not always true, contrarily to the ring topology. For instance, in a tree-based algorithm
(e.g. Raymond’s mutual exclusion algorithm [13]) the token does not always travel between
k distinct successive nodes of the logical tree;
• In our ring-base approach, the token holder knows which are the k nodes that should
receive the token after it and this is not always possible for some algorithms as, for instance,
algorithms where the token circulates only between nodes that have requested it such as
in Suzuki and Kasami’s mutual exclusion algorithm [14].
The solution we propose for the above problems is that the following: token holder chooses
the set of its successors by exploiting as much as possible the knowledge that it has about the
future path of the token (e.g. set of nodes from which the token holder has received a request
that has not been satisfied yet as in [14]). See Figure 6(a), where S4 is the current token holder.
Additionally, if the number of nodes of this set, whose nodes are all distinct, is smaller than k+1
(the token holder includes itself in this set), it will be completed with nodes which have held the
token recently. The latter are just used to control the liveness of the other nodes of this set, even
if they might become a token holder if all the nodes that they monitor crash. In Figure 6(b),
we respectively denote the first and the second type of nodes predictable and monitor. The
mentioned set is denoted T and k = 6. The respective detection set of each of the nodes of T
is given in Figure 6(c). Remark that, similarly to the ring topology, the k + 1 detection sets are
different from each other and have nested intersections. Each node of a detection set Di which
does not intersect with the nodes of the detection set nested by Di monitors these nodes. For
instance, S8 monitors S6, S1, and S4 while S5 monitors S4, S1, S6, and S8.
Before sending the token in the SafeSendToken function, Sk, the token holder, must update
its T set by replacing the monitor nodes by predictable ones as much as possible. Nodes are
replaced till either Sk is removed from TSi or there are no more sites in the predictable path.
Remark that it might happen that Sk is not removed from T if there are not enough new
predictable nodes. In this case, Sk will become a monitor node.
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S9 S7 S0 S5 S4 S1 S6 S8 ? ? ?
Previous token holders Future token holders
(a) The token path
S9 S7 S0 S5 S4 S1 S6 S8 ? ? ?
T : Token replication order set
Monitor nodes Predictable nodes
(b) The token replication order set
S9 S7 S0 S5 S4 S1 S6 S8 ? ? ?
DS7 DS0 DS5 DS4 DS1 DS6 DS8
(c) Detection sets
Figure 6: Generalized approach with k = 6
6 Related work
Several authors have proposed fault-tolerant extensions to token-based mutual exclusion algo-
rithms [15] [16] [17]. However, they usually adopt non scalable solutions to regenerate the token
such as an election algorithm as in Chang et al.’s work [17] or require that the site that detected
the loss of the token receives a positive acknowledgement from the other sites before regenerating
a new token [15] [16].
Misra [2] proposes in his termination detection article to adapt the algorithm in order to
detect the loss of the token and regenerate a new one for ring topologies. The author argues
that token of loss is similar to application termination if only token messages are considered.
Similarly to our solution he uses the concept of backup/real tokens: there are two symmetrical
tokens in the system but one is the backup. However, the algorithm works only if a token is not
lost within the round of the other token’s loss. Wu et al. [18] extended Misra’s work to offer a
mutual exclusion algorithm for MANETs that tolerates token losses.
In [19], Mueller presents an interesting mechanism to support fault tolerance for token-based
synchronization protocols. A logical ring is used to detect a node failure and, if necessary, elect
a new token holder. However, the detection and handling of failures are not transparent to the
application as in our approach. The application must be modified to add a monitoring mechanism
which then calls the author’s fault-tolerant mechanism when a failure is suspected. A second
difference with regard of our approach is that when a new token is regenerated, the information
kept by it is not preserved or restored as in our solution.
Many total order broadcast algorithms adopt a token-based ring mechanism for ordering
message [7]. The token circulates among all nodes or a subset of them. Some of these algorithms
such as [20] and [8] tolerate failures but involve costly global mechanism such as a reformation
phase [20] or a membership protocol [8] for redefining the logical ring and electing a new token
holder.
A work close to ours is R. Ekwall et al.’s [21]: nodes are organized in a logical ring and the
token is sent to the f + 1 successors, where f is the maximum number of failures. However, the
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goal of the authors’ approach differs from ours. They consider an asynchronous system on top of
which they want to build a consensus algorithm based on token. A node expects to receive the
token from its predecessor. On the other hand, if the former suspects that the latter has failed,
it waits the token from any of the f predecessors. Contrarily to our solution, failure detection
is not perfect and the uniqueness of the token is not ensured. Furthermore, the proposal of our
algorithm is that it can be exploited by ring-based algorithms which need token uniqueness in
presence of failures. This portability is not offered by the authors’ approach whose aims are
to provide a consensus and atomic broadcast algorithms. A last remark is that our algorithm
tolerates k consecutive failures, i.e., it might be that the total number of failures is greater than
k.
7 Conclusion
We have presented in this article an algorithm that avoids the loss of the token by maintaining
temporal backup copies of the token on k consecutive nodes. Its functions can be easily called by
existing token ring-based algorithms in order to make them tolerant to k consecutive failures. If
the token holder fails, the token regeneration is almost instantaneous and quit inexpensive due
to the mentioned backup copies and the invariants kept by the algorithm. One key feature of our
solution is that it is scalable since it depends on k and not on N . Furthermore, the information
that the token retains is not lost when a new one is regenerated. We have also presented a study
of the probability of having at most k consecutive node crashes in the presence of f failures in a
ring with N nodes which shows that the value of k to tolerate the f failures with a probability
closer to 100% is quite small. Finally, we have discusses the challenges of extending our algorithm
to other logical topologies and have proposed a solution that keeps the good properties of our
algorithm.
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8 Appendix: Proof
In order to prove the correctness of our algorithm ,we must show that the safety and liveness
properties always hold.
We suppose that the original algorithm correctly calls the functions offered by our algorithm
and verifies the safety and liveness properties.
Hyp. 1 A site can call the SafeSendToken function provided it keeps the REAL token.
We consider that time is discretized by SafeSendToken, SafeReceiveToken, and UseBackup
function executions. Time t0 is set by the execution of the Initialisation function. We denote C
such a discrete-time. Notice that processes do not have access to C which is only introduced for
the convenience of the proof presentation.
We denote P(Π) the power set of π and F(t) : C → P(Π) a function which returns the set of
faulty processes at t.
In order to express some variables in regard with C, we define a set of functions. For a given
time t ∈ C and a site S, each of these functions returns the value of a variable after being executed
at time t. The functions, which respectively return the value of variables token, count , and D
for site S at t, are the following:
Token(S, t) : π × C → {NONE ,BACKUP ,REAL}
Count(S, t) : π × C → N
D(S, t) : π × C → P(Π)
Finally, we define M(Si, t) as the set of pending messages 〈TOKEN,ST ,countrecv〉 addressed
to Si such that countrecv > count(Si, t) at t and M(t) is the set of all M(Si, t). We denote
〈PendREAL〉 the pending 〈TOKEN 〉 message of M(t) such that Si = ST and 〈PendBACKUP 〉
the other pending 〈TOKEN 〉 messages ofM(t).
For helping the proof of our algorithm, we introduce three properties. The property PSafetyCond
is a sufficient condition for proving the safety property. The two other properties, PCount and
PHolderMonitored respectively ensure that the token holder has the greatest count and that
the latter is always monitored respectively. These two properties must always hold in order to
ensure the safety property after a crash. ∀t ∈ C, the tree properties are thus defined as follows:
PSafetyCond(t): There exists at most one non faulty site Si that either holds the REAL
token or is the receiver of 〈PendREAL〉, i.e., a pending 〈TOKEN 〉 message which informs that
Si is the new token holder.
If PSafetyCond(t) holds, we denote:
• Holder(t): the non faulty site that satisfies PSafetyCond(t) or the last faulty node
which has verified PSafetyCond, i.e., when a site crashes, it is considered as Holder(t)
till a new one is regenerated.
• HCount(t): corresponds to Count(Holder(t), t), if Token(Holder(t), t) = REAL, or
equal to the count value of 〈PendREAL〉.
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PHolderMonitored(t):
∀Si ∈ π/F(t),D(Si, t) 6= ∅ =⇒
Holder(t) ∈ D(Si, t) (1)
∀〈TOKEN,ST , countrecv〉 ∈ M(Si, t),
Holder(t) ∈ {ST , .., Si} (2)
∀t ∈ C, PHolderMonitored(t).(1) states that the token holder is always monitored by those
nodes whose detection set is not empty and PHolderMonitored(t).(2) states that Si will start
monitoring the token holder when it receives 〈TOKEN,ST , countrecv〉.
PCount(t):
∀Si ∈ π/F(t),D(Si, t) 6= ∅ =⇒
HCount(t)− Count(Si, t) =
#(D(Si, t))−#({Holder(t), .., Si}) (3)
∀〈TOKEN,ST , countrecv〉 ∈ M(Si, t),
HCount(t)− countrecv = #({ST , .., Holder(t)})− 1 (4)
This property states that, ∀t ∈ C, the difference between the count of the token holder and the
count of either those sites that have non empty detection set or the one included in the messages
of M(t) is greater or equal to zero. In addition, such a difference depends on the position of
Holder(t) compared to either Si or ST (in the case of pending messages).
Since, in PCount(t), the difference between HCount(t) and any count value (of both non-
empty D sites and pending messages) is greater or equal to zero, we can define the following
corollary:
PMaxCount(t) (corollary of PCount(t)) : At t, the token holder has the greatest count
value among all non faulty sites and all 〈TOKEN 〉 pending messages.
We present now the lemmas that prove that the three above properties always hold ∀t ∈ C
which then will help us prove by induction the safety of our algorithm.
For each of these lemmas, we distinguish the calls to SafeReceiveToken, SafeSendToken and
UseBackup which discretize the time C.
Lemma 1 ∀t ∈ C, PSafetyCond(t)∧PCount(t)∧PHolderMonitored(t) =⇒ PSafetyCond(t+
1).
Proof. Suppose that PSafetyCond, PCount, and PHolderMonitored be true at t. At t+1,
site Si can call one of the three following functions:
1. SafeReceiveToken〈TOKEN,ST , countrecv〉: if 〈TOKEN,ST , countrecv〉 is a 〈PendBACKUP 〉,
Token(Si, t+ 1) = BACKUP (line 1) and PSafetyCond continues to hold at t+ 1; other-
wise since the message, 〈PendREAL〉, was pending at t, PSafetyCond(t) ensures that Si
was the Holder(t). Upon calling the function SafeReceiveToken, Si will continue to be the
token holder, i.e. Token(Si, t+ 1) = REAL. Moreover, there exists no other 〈PendREAL〉
in the system. Hence, PSafetyCond is true at t + 1 with Holder(t + 1) = Si, whose
identity, ST , is in the messages.
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∀Sx ∈ π/F(t),D(Sx, t) 6= ∅ ∧ PCount(t).(3)
=⇒
{
HCount(t)− count(Sx, t) = #(D(Sx, t))−#({Holder(t), .., Sx})




HCount(t)− count(Sx, t) = #(D(Sx, t))− (#({Holder(t), .., Si}) + #({Si, .., Sx})− 1)
HCount(t)− count(Si, t) = #(D(Si, t))−#({Holder(t), .., Si})
=⇒ count(Si, t)− count(Sx, t) = #(D(Sx, t))−#({Si, .., Sx}) + 1−#(D(Si, t))
=⇒ (count(Si, t) + #(D(Si, t))− 1)− count(Sx, t) = #(D(Sx, t))−#({Si, .., Sx})
=⇒
∗2
count(Si, t+ 1)− count(Sx, t) = #(D(Sx, t))−#({Si, .., Sx})
=⇒
∗3
HCount(t+ 1)− count(Sx, t+ 1) = #(D(Sx, t+ 1))−#({Holder(t+ 1), .., Sx})
=⇒ PCount(t+ 1).(3)
Notes:
∗1: Si ∈ {Holder(t), .., Sx}
∗2: count(Si, t+ 1) = count(Si, t) + #(D(Si, t))− 1)
∗3: Holder(t+ 1) = Si
Figure 7: Proof of the counter property upon calling UseBackup.
2. SafeSendToken: In this case, Hyp. 1 implies that Si must hold a REAL token. More-
over, PSafetyCond(t) ensures that there exists one site (Holder(t)) with a REAL token.
Hence, Holder(t) = Si. Since PMaxCount holds at t, there is no 〈PendREAL〉 ∈ M(t).
Finally, SafeSendToken also guarantees that Token(Si, t + 1) = NONE (line 1). Thus,
PSafetyCond is true at t+ 1 and Si+1 is the only token holder at t+ 1 (Holder(t+ 1)).
3. UseBackup: Lines 1 and 1 guarantee that Si only regenerates a new token when all the
sites it monitors, excepting itself, are faulty. Moreover, since PHolderMonitored holds at
t, Holder(t) belongs to the detection set D(Si, t). Hence, Si is the only Holder(t+ 1) and
thus PSafetyCond holds at t+ 1.
Lemma 2 ∀t ∈ C, PSafetyCond(t)∧PCount(t)∧PHolderMonitored(t) =⇒ PCount(t+ 1).
Proof. Let suppose that PSafetyCond, PCount, and PHolderMonitored are true at t. At
t+ 1, site Si can call one of the three following functions:
1. SafeReceiveToken〈TOKEN,ST , countrecv〉: Since Si does not send any message in
this function, PCount(t).(4) ensures PCount(t+1).(4) and, by definition, this call does not
change Holder(t). Moreover, HCount(t) = HCount(t+1) and PCount(t+1).(3) is verified
for all non faulty sites other than Si. Thus, in order to prove this lemma, we just need to
show that PCount(t+ 1).(3) holds for Si. Line 1 ensures that count(Si, t+ 1) = countmsg.
Moreover, line 1 implies that D(Si, t+ 1) = {ST , .., Si}, hence:
#(D(Si, t+ 1)) = #({ST , ..,Holder(t+ 1)}) + #({Holder(t+ 1), .., Si})− 1.
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PCount(t).(4) =⇒ HCount(t)− countmsg =
#({ST , .., Holder(t)})− 1
=⇒ HCount(t+ 1)− count(Si, t+ 1) =
#(D(Si, t+ 1))−#({Holder(t+ 1), .., Si})
=⇒ PCount(t+ 1).(3) for Si
2. SafeSendToken: Since Si adds one to count before sending the 〈TOKEN 〉 message,
HCount(t + 1) = HCount(t) + 1 (line 1). In addition, as Holder(t + 1) = Si+1 (the
successor of Si in the ring), for every site Sx, with a non empty D at t, #(D(Sx, t +
1)) − #{Holder(t + 1), .., Si)} is also incremented by one. Therefore, PCount(t + 1).(3)
is true. Analogously, we can prove that PCount(t + 1).(4) holds for all current pending
〈TOKEN 〉 messages ∈M(Si, t). To complete the proof, we must show that the 〈TOKEN,
ST , count recv〉 messages sent by Si at t verify PCount(t + 1).(4). Since, at t + 1, ST =
Holder(t+ 1) and count recv = HCount(t+ 1), we have: HCount(t+ 1)−HCount(t+ 1) =
#({Holder(t+ 1), ..,Holder(t+ 1)})− 1.
3. UseBackup: Let Sx be a non faulty site with a non empty D at t. Si belongs to
{Holder(t), .., Sx}. If such was not the case, Sx would belong to {Holder(t), .., Si} and,
since PHolderMonitored(t) ensures that Holder(t) ∈ D(Si, t), Sx would belong to D(Si, t)
too. However, as Si called the function UseBackup, Sx should be faulty. We come therefore
to a contradiction.
Moreover, when Si executes UseBackup, it updates its count such that count(Si, t+ 1) =
count(Si, t) + #(D(Si, t)) − 1 (line 1). Hence, as show in Figure 7, we can include Si in
{Holder(t), .., Sx}) in order to be able to exploit such an increment. Thus, we prove that
the fonction UseBackup preserve the counter property on all sites : PCount(t).(3) =⇒
PCount(t+ 1).(3).
The same reasoning can be applied for the pending messages by replacing count(Si, t) by
countrecv.
Lemma 3 ∀t ∈ C, PSafetyCond(t)∧PCount(t)∧PHolderMonitored(t) =⇒ PHolderMonitored(t+
1).
Proof. Let PSafetyCond, PCount, and PHolderMonitored be true. At t. At t+ 1, site Si can
call one of the three functions:
1. SafeReceiveToken〈TOKEN,ST , countrecv〉: Since PHolderMonitored(t) is true,Holder(t) ∈
{ST , .., Si}. Hence, when Si considers this set as its new detection set (line 1), Si will start
monitoring the token holder: Holder(t) = Holder(t+ 1) ∈ D(Si, t+ 1)
2. SafeSendToken: in this case, the new token holder is the successor of Si in the ring:
Holder(t + 1) = Si+1. Since a non-empty D of a non faulty site Sj is always composed
of the set of continuous predecessors of Sj in the ring, and since PHolderMonitored(t)
ensures that Holder(t) = Si belongs to this set, Si+1 belongs to every non empty set
Sj such that Sj 6= Si (notice that in line 1 Si empties its D). Furthermore, for all
〈TOKEN,ST , countrecv〉 of M(Si, t + 1) such that Sj 6= Si, Si+1 ∈ {ST , . . . Sj}. Thus,
Holder(t+ 1) is monitored at t+ 1.
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3. UseBackup: To prove it, we must show that Si = Holder(t+ 1) (Lemma 1) belongs to
every non-empty detection set. We can easily prove it by contradiction. Let us suppose that
there exists one non-faulty site Sx with a non empty detection set such that Si 6∈ D(Sx, t).
Since {Holder(t), .., Sx} ⊂ D(Sx, t) (PHolderMonitored(t)), Si 6∈ {Holder(t), .., Sx} and
thus
{Holder(t), .., Sx} ⊂ {Holder(t), .., Si}. Moreover, since {Holder(t), .., Si} ⊂ D(Si, t)
(PHolderMonitored(t)), Sx ∈ D(Si, t) which is a contradiction because Si calls function
UseBackup only when all the sites it monitors, except itself, are faulty (lines 29 and 36).
Based on the same reasoning, we prove that PHolderMonitored holds at t + 1 for the
pending messages.
Theorem 1 Our algorithm ensures the safety property.
Proof. Based on the previous lemmas, we can easily prove by induction that the three properties
PSafetyCond, PCount and PHolderMonitored are always verified.
At t = 0, the function Initialisation is executed and the three properties are thus verified:
• PSafetyCond(0): S0 is the only token holder (line 1) and there exists no pending
〈TOKEN 〉 message.
• PCount(0): all sites have the same count value (line 1).
• PHolderMonitored(0) : Each node with a non-empty detection set monitors the token
holder S0.
Suppose that all tree properties hold at time t. Lemmas 1, 2, and 3, ensure that properties
PSafetyCond, PCount, and PHolderMonitored are true at t+ 1 respectively.
Since the PSafetyCond is a sufficient condition to ensure the safety property, we can state
that our algorithm ensures this property.
Theorem 2 For at most k consecutive failures, our algorithm ensures the liveness property.
Proof. In order to prove the liveness property, it is sufficient to prove that (1) if the token is not
lost, it will be sent from a site to its successor on the ring and that (2) if the token is lost due to
the failure of the current holder of the REAL token, the latter will be regenerated by one of the
non faulty k successors of the faulty token holder.
The first one (1) is easily proved because when Si sends the 〈TOKEN 〉 message (line 1)
at t, it informs in the message that the next holder of the REAL token is Si+1 (Holder(t +
1) = Si+1.) Additionally, as the channels are reliable and Si has the greatest count value at t,
(PSafetyCond(t) and PHolderCount(t)), Si+1 will deliver the token to the original algorithm
(line 1) upon reception of the message.
To prove the seconde one (2), let us consider that Si is the last site to hold the token which sent
the 〈TOKEN 〉 message at t to its k successors and that f is the number of faulty direct successors
of Si. Since f ≤ k, site Si has sent the message to the correct site Si+f+1 ∈ {Si+1, .., Si+k+1}.
Moreover, for the same reasons described in (1), Si+f+1 will eventually receive the message and
will not discard it. Line 1 will thus set D of Si+f+1 to {Si+1, .., Si+f+1}. By assumption, the
failures of sites {Si+1, .., Si+f} are (resp. will be) detected which will result in the calling of the
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